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Abstract - I estimate the relationship between taxes and income 
growth using data from 1970–1999 and the forty–eight continental 
U.S. states. I fi nd that taxes used to fund general expenditures are 
associated with signifi cant, negative effects on income growth. This 
fi nding is generally robust across alternative variable specifi cations, 
alternative estimation procedures, alternative ways of dividing the 
data into “fi ve–year” periods, and across different time periods and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, though state–specifi c 
estimates vary widely. I also provide an explanation for why previous 
research has had diffi culty identifying this “robust” relationship.
INTRODUCTION
A long–standing research enterprise has been devoted to estimating the effect of taxes on economic growth in U.S. 
states. To the extent a consensus exists, it is that taxes used to 
fund transfer payments have small, negative effects on eco-
nomic activity. When used to fund productive expenditures, 
the associated tax effects are often estimated to vanish, or even 
become positive (Helms, 1985; Bartik, 1991; Phillips and Goss, 
1995; Wasylenko, 1997). However, even this modest conclu-
sion is disputed, since estimated effects vary widely across 
studies (Bartik, 1991; McGuire, 1992; Wasylenko, 1997).
Given the scores of studies that have investigated this 
issue, it is surprising that many important estimation issues 
are often not addressed. My study takes up several of these, 
and re–estimates the relationship between taxes and income 
growth. I fi nd that taxes used to fund general expenditures 
are associated with signifi cant, negative effects on income 
growth. Further, I show that these effects are generally robust 
across estimation procedures, alternative specifi cations of 
the regression equation, different time divisions of the data, 
and across time periods and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) regions. I also provide a possible explanation for 
why previous research has had diffi culty identifying these 
effects.
My analysis addresses the following estimation issues. 
First, it uses economic theory to derive an estimable equation. 
With respect to specifi cation of the regression equation, theory 
has consequences for the following: (1) the inclusion/exclu-
sion of labor, capital, and population variables along with, 
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or instead of, underlying parameters such 
as saving, depreciation, and population 
growth rates; (2) the inclusion/exclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable; and (3) 
whether to include other explanatory 
variables in level or differenced forms. 
The Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion has now become a standard point 
of departure for models of economic 
growth. Studies that have analyzed U.S. 
state fi scal policy1 within this framework 
include Merriman (1990), Garcia–Milá 
and McGuire (1992), Evans and Karras 
(1994), Holtz–Eakin (1994), Garcia–Milá, 
McGuire, and Porter (1996), Aschauer 
(2000), Yamarik (2000), and Shioji (2001). 
My study follows suit by employing a 
general version of the Cobb–Douglas 
production function that includes the text-
book Solow model and the augmented, 
human capital model of Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil (1992) as special cases. 
A second specifi cation issue concerns 
the role of time. Much of the previous 
literature has restricted taxes to have 
only contemporaneous effects on eco-
nomic activity. When dynamic effects are 
incorporated, it is usually done indirectly, 
through the inclusion of a lagged income 
variable (e.g., Helms, 1985). My regression 
specifi cations allow taxes to have both 
contemporaneous and lagged effects.2 
A related issue concerns how to defi ne 
the length of a time period for time series 
observations of states. Previous research 
on state–level taxes and growth has relied 
almost exclusively on either cross–sec-
tional (e.g., Romans and Subrahmanyam, 
1979; Mullen and Williams, 1994; Yamarik, 
2000) or annual panel data (e.g., Helms, 
1985; Crain and Lee, 1999).
Cross–sectional data is undesirable 
because it ignores time–varying behavior 
in the explanatory variables. This is par-
ticularly a problem for taxes:  The average 
state tax burden in 1999 was very close 
to its level in 1970 (cf. Reed, 2006, Figure 
1), despite large variation over time. 
Cross–sectional analyses also suffer from 
omitted variable bias due to uncontrolled 
fi xed effects––to the extent these are not 
picked up in initial income levels. 
On the other hand, annual data is par-
ticularly vulnerable to measurement error 
bias. This is, again, of particular relevance 
for tax studies. Using two very different 
approaches, Reed and Rogers (2006, 2007) 
estimate that roughly one–half of the 
annual variation in tax burden is due to 
factors other than tax policy. This bias is 
exacerbated by the inclusion of state fi xed 
effects. Further, annual state–level income 
data are characterized by substantial serial 
correlation (cf. Evans and Karras, 1994). 
The combination of serial correlation with 
a lagged dependent variable produces 
inconsistent estimates.
Multi–year interval data also suffer 
from these problems, but to a lesser 
degree: Measurement errors are more 
likely to cancel out over longer time 
periods. Serial correlation is less severe 
when observations are distanced further 
in time. A few studies have analyzed the 
effects of fi scal policy using multiple–year 
interval data. These include Garcia–Milá 
et al. (1996), Aschauer (2000), Shioji (2001), 
Chernick (1997), Tomljanovich (2004), and 
Bania, Gray, and Stone (2007), though only 
the latter three directly study taxes. My 
analysis estimates tax effects over 30 years 
using fi ve–year interval data. 
 1 The subsequent discussion of previous research restricts itself to state–level analyses in which the dependent 
variable is income or income growth, where income is measured either by Personal Income or Gross State 
Product in either total or per capita terms.
 2 Tomljanovich (2004) also allows for dynamic tax effects, but his study only includes state taxes, not state and 
local. The practical implication of this is that it ignores property taxes, among others, and locally fi nanced 
public expenditures. The empirical importance of these is demonstrated by Helms (1985).
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A third issue is the selection of “control 
variables.” Growth theory is suffi ciently 
general that many variables are potential 
determinants of growth. Despite this, 
many studies of tax effects include no, 
or only a few, non–fi scal variables other 
than initial/lagged income, time, and/or 
state–fi xed effects (cf. Becsi, 1996; Tom-
ljanovich, 2004; Yamarik, 2000). Helms 
(1985) includes variables for state wages, 
percent unionization, and population den-
sity. Mullen and Williams (1994) include 
variables for growth of the civilian labor 
force, and the growth rates of private and 
public capital. Bania et al. (2007) employ 
the unemployment rate, percentage of 
the population that is working age, and 
union membership rates. Only Chernick 
(1997) and, notably, Crain and Lee (1999) 
have a broad set of control variables. My 
study includes an extensive set of control 
variables to avoid problems of bias associ-
ated with omitted variables.
That being said, it is well known that 
coefficient estimates are often highly 
dependent upon the particular set of 
variables included in the regression equa-
tion (Leamer, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 
1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Sala–i–Martin, 
2004). To address this problem, I employ 
model selection criteria to determine 
variable selection. Further, I investigate 
the robustness of my results to alternative 
specifi cations. 
A fourth issue concerns the choice of 
estimation procedure. Panel data are 
potentially characterized by complex error 
structures. Most previous research on 
fi scal policy uses Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) (e.g., Garcia–Milá and McGuire, 
1992; Chernick, 1997; Crain and Lee, 1999), 
or OLS with standard errors corrected for 
general heteroscedasticity (e.g., Aschauer, 
2000; Tomljanovich, 2004) or serial cor-
relation (Evans and Karras, 1994). A few 
studies employ feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) to address random 
effects (Garcia–Milá et al., 1996; Helms, 
1985; Holtz–Eakin, 1994), though this 
procedure is usually rejected in favor of 
OLS with fi xed effects. Dynamic panel 
data (DPD) estimators have occasionally 
been used to obtain consistent estimates 
when the regression specifi cation includes 
both a lagged dependent variable and 
fi xed effects (Holtz–Eakin, 1994; Shioji, 
2001; and Bania et al., 2007). My analysis 
allows for a variety of serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity, and cross–sectional 
correlation behaviors in the error term. It 
investigates the robustness of estimating 
tax effects using alternative OLS, FGLS, 
and DPD estimators. 
A fi fth issue addresses the role of infl u-
ential observations. Point estimates may 
mask the fact that results can be driven 
by just a few time periods, or just a few 
states. This is of particular importance to
policymakers who are interested in 
extrapolating the results of empirical 
studies to their own states and time 
periods. With only a few exceptions, 
previous research on tax effects reports 
only average effects: Mullen and Williams 
(1994) and Chernick (1997) check for (1) 
robustness across different time periods 
and (2) the effect of omitting some states 
from their samples. My analysis goes 
further by interacting tax variables with 
time, region, and state dummy variables 
to check for robustness across these 
dimensions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The 
second section derives a model of income 
growth that is general enough to encom-
pass many of the models that have been 
used in previous research. The third 
section describes the data and discusses 
associated specification issues. The 
fourth section presents the initial empiri-
cal results. The fi fth section checks for 
robustness across (1) alternative variable 
specifi cations, (2) alternative estimation 
procedures, (3) different time divisions 
of the data, and (4) different time periods, 
regions, and states. The sixth section pro-
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vides a possible explanation for why my 
study fi nds a robust relationship between 
taxes and income growth while previous 
studies have not. The seventh section 
concludes.
A MODEL OF INCOME GROWTH
I assume that state income (Yt) is deter-
mined by the following general version 
of the Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion,
[1] Y A K L Q A Q K Lt t t t t t t t t= =
α β β α β( ) ,
where Kt and Lt are capital and employ-
ment, Qt is the effi ciency of labor, and At 
represents other factors that influence 
state incomes (e.g., human capital vari-
ables, factor neutral productivity deter-
minants). The textbook Solow model and 
the augmented human capital model of 
Mankiw et al. (1992) are both special cases 
of equation [1].3
Dividing both sides by population, Nt, 
gives
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where Ct = [ln(At) – ln(At–L)] + β[ln(Qt) – 
ln(Qt–L)] and L = the length of the time 
period minus 1 (e.g., for a fi ve–year period 
with t measuring calendar years, L = 4).4 
Equation [5] identifi es changes in capital, 
employment, and population as important 
determinants of income growth. The last 
term, Ct, collects the additional effects of all 
other variables on income growth. Within 
this framework, taxes can affect economic 
growth via two channels. First, they can 
directly infl uence capital, employment, 
and population growth. Second, they can 
infl uence the way capital, labor and other 
resources are employed—either encourag-
ing or discouraging their most productive 
employment.
DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
My data consist of observations on 48 
U.S. states from 1970–1999.5 I decided 
on this particular time period because a 
longer time frame would have required 
me to omit many variables of interest. The 
respective 30 years of data are grouped 
l
 3 The textbook Solow model is Y K L Q Q K L
t t t t t t t
= =
− − −α α α α α( )1 1 1 . Mankiw et al.’s augmented version of the Solow 
model is Y K H L Q H Q K L
t t t t t t t t t
= =
− − − − − −α β α β β α β α α β( )1 1 1 , where H represents human capital.
 4 An alternative specifi cation solves for the steady state value of y as a function of exogenous parameters, and 
then introduces convergence through the inclusion of a lagged value of the dependent variable. The main 
cost of this approach is that it requires the imposition of additional restrictions.
 5 Alaska and Hawaii were omitted, as is usual in studies of U.S. state economic growth.
l
l
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into six, five–year periods (1970–1974, 
1975–1979, … , 1995–1999). Data for most 
of these variables were collected from 
original data sources.6 
Besides previously cited benefi ts, fi ve–
year interval data7 offer two additional 
advantages over annual data: they (1) mini-
mize errors from misspecifying lag effects, 
and (2) reduce measurement error due to 
time–specifi cation issues. The latter arise 
because data can have different start and 
end periods within a given calendar year. 
For example, state income data are defi ned 
over calendar years; state fi scal data are 
defi ned over fi scal years (which are differ-
ent for different states); and other variables 
(e.g., employment, population data) may 
be measured at different points within the 
year (beginning/middle/end). In addi-
tion, a number of variables (e.g., variables 
based on decennial Census data) require 
annual interpolation in order to get a bal-
anced panel. The errors associated with 
both types of time–specifi cation issues are 
mitigated by using longer–interval data.
Following equation [5], the general 
specifi cation for the empirical models is8
[6] DLNYt =
   β β β β0 1 2 3+ + +
+
DLNK DLNL DLNN
state fixed eff
t t t
ects time fixed effects+
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
   ( ), , , ,+ − + +∑ ∑− −δ λ εd
d
d t d t l l t
l
tX X X4 4
where t = 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999; 
DLNYt, DLNKt, DLNLt, and DLNNt are the 
respective difference quantities from equa-
tion [5] multiplied by 100 (to give percent); 
(Xdt – Xd,t–4) is the change in the explanatory 
variable over the fi ve–year period—where 
the subscript “d” represents the “differ-
enced” form of X; and Xl,t–4 is the value of 
the explanatory variable at the beginning 
of the fi ve–year period—with subscript 
“l” representing “level” form. Note that 
the last two terms can also be thought of 
as capturing the “contemporaneous” and 
“lagged” effects of X.9 
A comparison of equations [5] and 
[6] reveals that both “differenced” and 
“level” forms of X are used as proxies for 
Ct = [ln(At) – ln(At–L)] + β[ln(Qt) – ln(Qt–L)]. 
Ct incorporates factors that affect the 
growth rate of productivity. As this term 
appears in differences, one may ques-
tion why level forms of X are included. 
Consider the role of education. It is likely 
that the stock of human capital (as distinct 
from the growth rate of human capital) is 
a determinant of the creation of new ideas, 
which contribute to productivity growth. 
This argues that level–measures of human 
capital, such as educational achievement, 
also be included as potential determinants 
of Ct. Similar arguments can be made for 
other variables.10 
An alternative argument for including 
both “differenced” and “level” variables 
arises when these are seen as representing 
“contemporaneous” and “lagged” effects. 
For example, taxes may have immediate 
effects on the allocation of resources. They 
may also have persistent effects, as the 
effort to smooth adjustment costs causes 
tax–induced re–allocations of resources to 
be delayed into future time periods. 
 6 The Appendix presents statistical descriptions of all the variables used in this study.
 7 The data are formatted in terms of fi ve–year differences, not averages (cf. equation [5]).
 8 I do not impose the restriction that β β β
3 1 2
1= + −( )  because population growth could also be related to Ct, 
in which case the restriction would be violated. 
 9 For an alternative derivation that arrives at a virtually identical specifi cation, see Bassanini, Scarpetta, and 
Hemmings (2001).
10 Previous studies of fi scal policy that specify income growth as the dependent variable have typically included 
either (1) level (cf. Helms, 1985; Chernick, 1997; Yamarick, 2000) or (2) differenced forms of the explanatory 
variables (cf. Evans and Karras, 1994; Garcia–Milá et al., 1996; Crain and Lee, 1999), but not both. Romans 
and Subrahmanyam (1979) and Mullen and Williams (1994) are the exceptions.
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As my measure of taxes, I use tax 
burden, defi ned as the ratio of state and 
local tax revenues to personal income. 
Tax burden is by far the most commonly 
employed measure of state taxation, and 
can be thought of as the “effective aver-
age tax rate” in a state (e.g., Helms, 1985; 
Mofi di and Stone, 1990; Mullen and Wil-
liams, 1994; Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994; 
Knight, 2000; Caplan, 2001; Yamarik, 2000, 
2004; Alm and Rogers, 2005).
INITIAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the initial results. 
The fi rst column reports the results of 
estimating a narrowly specifi ed version 
of equation [6]. The only explanatory vari-
able from the set of differenced variables 
is the change in tax burden, TaxBurden(D); 
and the only explanatory variable from 
the set of level variables is the value of 
tax burden at the beginning of the period, 
TaxBurden(L).11
Both tax variables are negative and 
highly signifi cant (the t–values are –4.38 
and –2.25, respectively). This suggests 
that taxes have both an immediate and a 
persistent effect. The coeffi cient estimate 
for TaxBurden(D) indicates that a one per-
centage–point increase in tax burden over 
a fi ve–year period is associated with lower 
real Per Capita Personal Income (PCPI) 
growth of 1.37 percent during that period. 
TABLE 1
ESTIMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX BURDEN AND INCOME GROWTH: 
INITIAL RESULTS
DLNK
DLNL
DLNN
TaxBurden(D)
TaxBurden(L)
R2
SIC
AICc
Observations
Hypothesis Tests
 State effects = 0
 Time effects = 0
(1)
Dep. 
Variable =
DLNY
0.3304
(7.26)
0.4258
(6.70)
0.4241
(5.02)
–1.3660
(–4.38)
–0.8979
(–2.25)
0.850
729.84
815.28
288
χ2 = 120.46
(p–value = 0.000)
χ2 = 86.76
(p–value = 0.000)
(2)
Dep. 
Variable =
DLNK
—
—
—
–2.5881
(–2.43)
–0.8318
(–0.88)
0.345
—
—
288
χ2 = 91.67
(p–value = 0.000)
χ2 = 90.93
(p–value = 0.000)
(3)
Dep. 
Variable =
DLNL
—
—
—
–0.8380
(–2.71)
–0.3143
(–0.85)
0.629
—
—
288
χ2 = 46.67
(p–value = 0.486)
χ2 = 301.00
(p–value = 0.000)
(4)
Dep. 
Variable =
DLNN
—
—
—
–0.0346
(–0.13)
–0.5907
(–1.31)
0.766
—
—
288
χ2 = 787.22
(p–value = 0.000)
χ2 = 54.68
(p–value = 0.000)
(5)
Dep. 
Variable =
DLNY
—
—
—
–2.5925
(–4.31)
–1.5571
(–2.15)
0.528
1043.76
1156.85
288
χ2 = 60.99
(p–value = 0.083)
χ2 = 194.79
(p–value = 0.000)
Note: Coeffi cients are estimated using OLS. t–statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using White het-
eroscedasticity–robust standard errors. All equations include state and time fi xed effects. AICc denotes the “corrected” 
version of the AIC. Summary statistics for each of the variables are reported in the Appendix.
11 A mathematically equivalent specifi cation is to include the level of tax burden at the beginning and end of 
the period (times t – 4 and t, respectively). 
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A further consequence arises because this 
increase causes future periods to com-
mence with a higher level of taxes. This 
lagged effect is measured by the coeffi cient 
on TaxBurden(L): A state having an initial 
tax burden that is one percentage point 
higher than other states is estimated to 
have real PCPI growth that is 0.90 percent 
lower in subsequent fi ve–year periods. 
Two points are worth noting. First, these 
effects represent the net effect of taxes and 
spending. Since expenditure variables 
are omitted from the specifi cation, and 
since the relationship between U.S. state 
expenditures and revenues is generally 
one–to–one, the respective coeffi cients 
should be interpreted as an increase in 
taxes to fund general (unspecifi ed) expen-
ditures.12 Second, these estimated effects 
are sizeable. The mean value of the tax 
burden variable is 10.87, and the mean 
growth rate of real PCPI (DLNY) is 8.23 
percent. Thus, tax variable coeffi cients in 
the range of –1.0 represent economically 
important relationships. 
With respect to the rest of the equation, 
the other coeffi cient estimates confi rm the 
expected result that increases in a state’s 
capital stock (DLNK), employed labor 
force (DLNL), and population (DLNN) 
are each associated with greater income 
growth. Overall, the equation has good 
explanatory power—a result that largely 
persists even when the state and time 
fi xed effects are omitted.13
The estimated tax impacts of column 1 
hold constant any effects that taxes might 
have on investment, employment, and 
population growth. One might reason-
ably expect taxes to be related to these as 
well. Columns 2–4 report the results of 
investigating this hypothesis by respec-
tively regressing each of these on the two 
tax variables plus state and time fi xed 
effects. Across all three equations, we see 
that higher taxes are associated with lower 
investment, lower employment growth, 
and lower population growth. 
Notably, there are differences in the 
timing of the respective estimated effects. 
Columns 2 and 3 report that an increase 
in tax burden is associated with a statisti-
cally signifi cant decrease in investment 
and employment growth during the same 
five–year period. Beyond that period, 
the tax effects are smaller and statisti-
cally insignifi cant. In contrast, column 4 
indicates that an increase in tax burden 
is estimated to have a negligible contem-
poraneous effect on population growth. 
However, there is some evidence to indi-
cate that higher taxes lower population 
growth in later time periods (the respec-
tive p–value is 0.19). These results are 
consistent with expectations about how 
taxes might affect each of these variables: 
investment and employment are more 
easily adjusted in the short–run, while 
migration decisions respond more slowly 
and require more time to be realized.
The preceding results suggest that 
taxes infl uence state income growth via 
two general channels. The fi rst channel is 
associated with the term, Ct, which collects 
changes in the effi ciency of labor (Qt) plus 
the effects of other time–varying factors 
related to productivity (At). The second 
channel is via the terms DLNK, DLNL, 
and DLNN, which incorporate the effects 
of taxes on investment, employment, and 
12 Many empirical growth studies follow Helms (1985) and include expenditures along with tax variables, with 
welfare expenditures as the omitted category. In contrast, my study—along with several others (e.g., Chernick, 
1997; Tomljanovich, 2004)—does not. This affects the interpretation of the estimated tax effect. In the former 
case, the estimated tax effect represents the effect of raising tax revenues to fund welfare expenditures. In 
the latter case, the estimated effect represents the effect of raising tax revenues to fund general expenditures 
(assuming non–tax revenues and defi cit remain constant). I prefer the latter specifi cation because it represents 
the more relevant policy question. Further below, I investigate the consequences of including expenditure 
variables in the specifi cation.
13 The R2 value for the same specifi cation without state and time fi xed effects is 0.744.
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population growth. Ideally, one could 
measure the combined effect of tax bur-
den on income growth by estimating a 
structural system of equations with DLNY, 
DLNK, DLNL, and DLNN all treated as 
endogenous. Unfortunately, a lack of 
good instruments makes this approach 
unfeasible.14 
An alternative is to estimate a reduced 
form version of column 1, omitting the 
terms DLNK, DLNL, and DLNN. The last 
column of Table 3 reports the results of this 
exercise. As expected, the combined effect 
of taxes is estimated to be substantially 
larger. A one percentage point increase in 
tax burden is associated with a contem-
poraneous decrease of 2.59 percent in real 
PCPI growth. In addition, future fi ve–year 
growth rates are estimated to be lower by 
1.56 percent. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Robustness with Respect to Alternative 
Specifi cations
One concern with the previous set of 
results is that the estimated tax effects may 
suffer from omitted variable bias. Thus, it 
is important to control for the infl uence of 
other variables that may affect state income 
growth. The subsequent analysis takes the 
specifi cation in column 1 of Table 1 as its 
starting point, and appends this with theo-
retically appropriate control variables. 
It is clear from equation [5] that any 
number of variables could be included 
as proxies for the unobserved term, Ct. 
For example, Garcia–Milà and McGuire 
(1993) argue that a state’s industrial’s 
composition will matter if agglomeration 
economies or knowledge spillovers dif-
fer by industry. Ciccone and Hall (1996) 
hypothesize that the density of economic 
activity infl uences productivity due to 
externalities associated with physical 
proximity, among other reasons. Educa-
tion and other demographic variables 
can proxy for productivity growth from 
human capital. 
Reed (2008) identifi es 32 variables that 
have been used or suggested by previous 
studies. Eliminating the public sector 
variables (such as categories of public 
spending or taxes)—since including these 
would change the nature of the tax vari-
ables—leaves 13 non–tax variables. These 
are identifi ed in Table 2. Each of these can 
be argued to be included in differenced 
or level (initial value) form. If one also 
allows the initial value of income to be 
included as a regressor,15 and recalls that 
the differenced form of the population 
variable (DLNN) is already included in 
the core specifi cation, one obtains a total 
of 26 possible control variables.16 
While it is likely that many of these vari-
ables do not really belong in the regression 
equation, it is not apparent a priori which 
ones should be excluded. Choosing one 
or a few sets of control variables is poten-
tially a problem, since previous literature 
(e.g., Leamer, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 
1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Sala–i–Martin 
14 I estimated a model with lagged values of DLNK, DLNL, DLNN, and TaxBurden(D) as instruments. This 
produced a positive, but insignifi cant coeffi cient for TaxBurden(D) (p–value = 0.758). However, I rejected this 
approach because the fi rst–stage estimates indicated weak correlations. For example, the partial F test for the 
excluded instruments in the TaxBurden(D) equation was 0.77, with a p–value of 0.511. Further, some of the other 
estimated coeffi cients were implausible, such as the fi nding that employment growth (DLNL) was associated 
with negative income growth.
15 Note that the interpretation of this variable should not be associated with convergence, since the model is not 
specifi ed in steady–state form. Rather, this variable should be interpreted as proxying for the effect of omitted, 
initial–value variables that affect productivity growth.
16 The variable DLNN potentially affects income growth through two channels: (1) directly (cf. equation [5]), and 
(2) indirectly, through Ct . If DLNN did not exert a separate effect via Ct , then its associated coeffi cient would 
be (β1 + β2 – 1) (cf. equations [5] and [6]). However, this hypothesis is consistently rejected in the subsequent 
empirical analyses. 
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TABLE 2
LIST OF POTENTIAL CONTROL VARIABLES
Variable
Education
Working population
Nonwhite
Female
Population
Population density
Urban
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Service
Mining
Union
Diversity
Description
Percent of population (aged 25 
and up) who have completed 
college (source: Census)
Percent of population between 
20 and 64 years of age (source: 
Census)
Percent of population that is 
nonwhite (source: Census)
Percent of population that is 
female (source: Census)
Log of total population 
(source: Census)
Population density 
(source: Census)
Percent of population living in 
urban areas (source: Census)
Share of total earnings earned in 
“Farm” and “Other Agriculture” 
industries (source: BEA)
Share of total earnings earned 
in “Manufacturing” industries 
(source: BEA)
Share of total earnings earned 
in “Service” industries (source: 
BEA)
Share of total earnings earned 
in “Mining” industries (source: 
BEA)
Percent of nonagricultural wage 
and salary employees who are 
union members (source: Hirsch, 
McPherson, and Vroman, 2001)
A measure of industrial diversity,  
Diversity
Earnings in Industry
Total Earni
i
=
 ngsi
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟∑
2
(source: BEA)
Selected Studies Which Have Used This 
or a Related Variable
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Garcia–Milà 
and McGuire (1992); Crown and Wheat (1995); 
Phillips and Goss (1995); Dalenberg and 
Partridge (1995); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Clark and Murphy (1996); Ciccone and Hall 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999)
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Mofi di and 
Stone (1990); Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); 
Crain and Lee (1999)
Mofi di and Stone (1990); Partridge and 
Rickman (1996); Crain and Lee (1999)
Mofi di and Stone (1990); Partridge and 
Rickman (1996); Clark and Murphy (1996)
Ciccone and Hall (1996); Alm and Rogers (2005)
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Carroll and 
Wasyenko (1994); Clark and Murphy (1996); 
Ciccone and Hall (1996); Crain and Lee (1999)
Holtz–Eakin (1993); Partridge and Rickman 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999)
Crown and Wheat (1995); Caselli and Coleman 
(2001)
Crown and Wheat (1995); Crain and Lee (1999); 
Caselli and Coleman (2001); Stansel (2005)
Clark and Murphy (1996)
Holtz–Eakin (1993); Crown and Wheat (1995); 
Clark and Murphy (1996); Mitchener and 
McLean (2003)
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Mofi di and Stone (1990); 
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Phillips and 
Goss (1995); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Clark and Murphy (1996)
Mofi di and Stone (1990); Garcia–Milà and 
McGuire (1993); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Crain and Lee (1999)
Note: This table is excerpted from Reed (2008).
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et al., 2004) has shown that estimated 
coeffi cients are often fragile, sensitive to 
the particular composition of condition-
ing variables. 
The problem is complicated by the 
fact that there are 226 ≅ 67 million ways 
to combine 26 variables, each one a pos-
sible regression specifi cation. I address 
the issue of variable specifi cation in the 
following way. First, I estimate a com-
plete specification that includes all 26 
variables. Next, I identify and estimate 
the “best” specifi cations as determined 
by two different model selection criteria, 
the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) 
and the corrected Akaike Information 
Criterion (AICc).17 This produces three 
sets of regression results, each of which 
is reported in Table 3. 
Of greatest interest are the fi rst two 
rows of Table 3. These report the esti-
mated coeffi cients of TaxBurden(D) and 
TaxBurden(L) after including alternative 
sets of control variables. Both tax coef-
ficients are smaller in absolute value 
compared to column 1 of Table 1, where 
the estimated values are –1.37 and –0.90, 
respectively. Nevertheless, they remain 
negative across all the expanded specifi -
cations of Table 3. Further, they continue 
to be highly signifi cant. In the “All Vari-
ables” specification, TaxBurden(D) and 
TaxBurden(L) have t–statistics (p–values) of, 
respectively, –2.58(0.011) and –2.87(0.004). 
The corresponding t–statistics are even 
higher in the “Best SIC” and “Best AICc” 
specifi cations. And while these latter two 
specifi cations are the product of sequen-
tial search, the t–statistics/p–values for the 
two tax variables can still be interpreted 
in the classical manner because the search 
procedure includes these two variables in 
every specifi cation. 
Turning to the other variables, I fi nd 
that the estimated coeffi cients are gener-
ally consistent with the predictions of 
growth theory, or at least not inconsistent. 
Focusing on the coeffi cients from column 
2 of Table 3—the “Best SIC Specifica-
tion”—we observe the following results 
(ignoring the distinction between initial 
levels and contemporaneous changes): 
higher educational attainment, a greater 
percentage of the population who are 
of working age, a greater percentage of 
the population that is nonwhite, a larger 
population, a greater reliance on agricul-
ture, and a more unionized workforce are 
associated with higher income growth. A 
larger female population, a larger mining 
sector, and greater industrial diversity are 
associated with lower income growth. 
Lastly, ceteris paribus, states with a greater 
initial value of real PCPI grow slower than 
other states. 
In conclusion, I fi nd that the signifi cant, 
negative tax effects fi rst reported in col-
umn 1 of Table 1 are robust to the inclusion 
of a wide variety of control variables.18 The 
next section investigates the robustness of 
the relationship between tax burden and 
state income growth when alternative 
estimation procedures are employed.
Robustness with Respect to Alternative 
Estimation Procedures
The subsequent analysis employs the 
variable specification of column 2 of 
Table 3 for additional robustness checks. 
This OLS equation displays good proper-
ties. It has a high R2, the key explanatory 
variables all have large t–statistics, the 
Durbin–Watson statistic is close to two, 
and a test of error normality fails to be 
rejected at the fi ve percent level.19 
17 These criteria, as well as the associated SAS/IML computer program that implements them, are described in 
further detail in Reed (2008).
18 I also included squared terms for the two tax variables, to allow for nonlinear tax effects. These are jointly 
signifi cant. Both estimated tax effects were monotonically negative for all observations within the sample 
range, except for the largest value of the TaxBurden(D) variable.
19 The Durbin–Watson statistic is 2.15; the Jarque–Bera statistic is 5.07, with an associated p–value of 0.079.
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TABLE 3
ROBUSTNESS CHECK ACROSS ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Variable Name1
Tax burden
Education
Working population
Nonwhite
Female
Population
Population density
Urban
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Service
Mining
Union
Diversity
LNY_1
Number of observations
R2
SIC
AICc
D/L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
(1)
All Variables
–0.4240
(–2.58)
–0.5838
(–2.87)
1.2504
(1.99)
1.2759
(6.84)
1.3235
(3.51)
0.9789
(4.42)
1.1447
(2.27)
–0.2699
(–1.77)
–2.7097
(–1.97)
0.3608
(0.46)
2.8954
(1.50)
0.0300
(0.74)
0.0217
(1.64)
–0.1486
(–1.32)
–0.0674
(–0.94)
0.5333
(4.19)
0.3413
(3.03)
–0.0218
(–0.13)
–0.0304
(–0.25)
0.0397
(0.16)
–0.3083
(–1.90)
–0.6314
(–2.72)
–0.3006
(–1.58)
0.1240
(1.86)
0.0182
(0.27)
0.2591
(1.00)
–0.2144
(–1.02)
–41.857
(–8.37)
288
0.938
624.70
675.36
(2)
Best SIC Specifi cation
–0.5470
(–3.59)
–0.6905
(–3.20)
1.4766
(2.44)
1.1221
(8.65)
1.6503
(4.75)
1.1264
(5.66)
1.2900
(2.87)
—
–3.4947
(–2.92)
—
4.0213
(3.19)
—
—
—
—
0.5365
(5.82)
0.3881
(5.54)
—
—
—
—
–0.5724
(–2.95)
—
0.1143
(2.10)
—
—
–0.3495
(–2.26)
–39.783
(–9.72)
288
0.933
572.52
647.78
(3)
Best AICc Specifi cation
–0.5368
(–3.36)
–0.7045
(–3.39)
1.1673
(2.00)
1.2004
(7.06)
1.3508
(4.21)
1.0405
(4.89)
1.0064
(2.20)
–0.3633
(–2.83)
–3.4630
(–2.92)
—
—
—
0.0269
(2.39)
—
—
0.5272
(5.08)
0.4084
(6.03)
—
—
—
–0.2956
(–2.57)
–0.5032
(–2.50)
—
0.1251
(2.37)
—
0.3241
(1.57)
—
–44.085
(–9.96)
288
0.935
573.91
645.00
1Summary statistics for each of the variables is reported in the Appendix.
Note: The regression equation follows the general specifi cation of equation [6] in the text. “D” and “L” stand for differenced and 
level forms of the variables. In addition to the variables listed above, the model includes the variables DLNK, DLNL, DLNN, and 
state and time fi xed effects. t–statistics are listed in parenthesis below each estimated coeffi cient and are calculated using White 
heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors. 
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
68
However, there are at least two con-
cerns. First, panel data are often character-
ized by complex error structures. Using 
the residuals from this specification, I 
tested for (1) fi rst–order serial correlation, 
(2) groupwise heteroscedasticity, and (3) 
cross–sectional correlation. I found no evi-
dence of signifi cant serial correlation (the 
estimated value of the AR(1) parameter 
was –0.02). However, I reject the hypoth-
esis of no groupwise heteroscedasticity20 
and fi nd substantial evidence of cross–sec-
tional correlation.21 This raises worries 
about the ineffi ciency of the coeffi cient 
estimates and biasedness in the estimates 
of the standard errors.22
Unfortunately, while one can estimate 
an error variance–covariance matrix that 
allows for cross–sectional correlation, one 
cannot invert that matrix, since N = 48 > T 
= 6. This precludes the use of Parks–type, 
feasible FGLS. However, there are several 
alternatives. One approach is to continue 
to use OLS, but adjust the standard errors 
for cross–sectional correlation; either by 
using Beck and Katz’s “panel–corrected 
standard error” procedure (Beck and Katz, 
1995), or by using a more robust estimator 
of the error variance–covariance matrix. 
Another is to follow–up a suggestion 
by Greene (2003, cf 333f) and use FGLS, 
weighting on groupwise heteroscedastic-
ity while adjusting the standard errors for 
cross–sectional correlation. Accordingly, I 
check for robustness of the estimated tax 
effects across the following alternative 
estimation procedures.
1. OLS with panel–corrected standard 
errors.
2. OLS with heteroscedasticity and 
cross–sectional correlation robust 
standard errors.
3. FGLS (weighted on groupwise 
heteroscedasticity) with heterosce-
dasticity robust standard errors.
4. FGLS (weighted on groupwise 
heteroscedasticity) with panel–cor-
rected standard errors.
5. FGLS (weighted on groupwise het-
eroscedasticity) with heteroscedas-
ticity and cross–sectional correlation 
robust standard errors.
There is an additional concern. The 
explanatory variables include both fi xed 
effects and a lagged form of the dependent 
variable as explanatory variables. This 
generates correlation between the error 
term and the lagged form of the depen-
dent variable, causing biased coeffi cient 
estimates (Nickell, 1981). To address this 
concern, I use two DPD estimators: the 
Arellano–Bond (difference) one–step and 
two–step procedures.23
Table 4 reports the estimates from these 
alternative estimation procedures. For 
comparison’s sake, the fi rst row duplicates 
20 I use the modifi ed Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity available in the STATA command xttest3. The 
corresponding sample Chi–square value is 798.30 with 48 degrees of freedom, and the associated p–value is 
0.0000.
21 I use Pesaran’s test for cross–sectional dependence available in the STATA command xtcsd, which is distributed 
asymptotically standard normal. The corresponding cross–sectional dependence (CD) statistic is –1.481 with a 
p–value of 0.1385. However, this test assumes that the cross–sectional correlations are all same–signed. It has 
low power when the cross–sectional correlations are not same–signed, which describes my data. The average, 
absolute value of the cross–sectional correlations is 0.375 even with the inclusion of time fi xed effects. This is 
quite large. Accordingly, I correct some of my estimates for cross–sectional correlation even though I do not 
formally reject the null hypothesis of no cross–sectional dependence. 
22 Note that “White standard errors” are robust only to heteroscedasticity, and not cross–sectional correlation.
23 The DPD estimates were obtained using STATA’s xtabond2 procedure. Note that both the one–step and 
two–step procedures assume no cross–sectional correlation. I do not use the DPD (system) estimator because 
the key moment condition in the level equation requires that the “distance” between a state’s initial income 
and its “steady–state” value be uncorrelated with the state fi xed effect (cf. Roodman, 2006, page 27). This is 
clearly violated in endogenous growth models and likely violated in exogenous growth models. 
The Robust Relationship between Taxes and U.S. State Income Growth
69
the tax coeffi cient estimates from column 
(2), Table 3. There are two main fi ndings 
from this analysis: Both FGLS and DPD 
confi rm earlier results in that they produce 
negative coefficient estimates for each 
of the tax variables. The FGLS estimates 
are similar in size to the OLS estimates, 
while the DPD estimates are generally 
larger (in absolute value). In addition, the 
statistical signifi cance of the tax effects is 
confi rmed across all alternative estimation 
procedures. Of the 16 t–statistics reported 
in Table 4, 14 imply signifi cance at the 
one percent level, with the remaining 
two signifi cant at the fi ve and ten percent 
levels. Accordingly, I conclude that my 
main fi ndings of negative, statistically 
signifi cant tax effects are robust across 
alternative estimation procedures.
Robustness across Alternative Cuts of 
the Data
The preceding analyses divide the 30 
years of data from 1970–1999 into six peri-
ods of fi ve–years each: 1970–1974, 1975–
1979, …, 1995–1999. This section looks at 
two alternative ways of dividing the data. 
The fi rst approach allows the endpoint of 
one fi ve–year period to coincide with the 
beginning of the next fi ve–year period. 
Following this approach, the data are 
divided as follows: 1970–1975, 1975–1980, 
1980–1985, …, 1995–2000. A drawback of 
this approach is that it forces dependency 
between contiguous time periods. An alter-
native approach keeps the endpoints and 
beginning points of the periods separate, 
but shifts the data by a year: 1971–1975, 
1976–1980, …, 1996–2000. 
This analysis takes its starting point 
as the variable specifi cation of column 2, 
Table 3, estimated with FGLS (weighting 
on groupwise heteroscedasticity) using 
robust Variance–Covariance Estimation 
(VCE) to address heteroscedasticity and 
cross–sectional correlation.24 These results 
were previously reported in abbreviated 
form in Table 4 and are repeated in column 
1 of Table 5. The subsequent two columns 
use the same variable specifi cation and 
estimation procedure, but employ differ-
ent cuts of the data.
Alternative cuts of the data can make a 
difference. For example, the estimates for 
Female(D) change considerably, with the 
TABLE 4
ROBUSTNESS CHECK USING ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
Procedure
OLS
 with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity
 with panel–corrected standard errors
 with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity and cross–sectional correlation
FGLS (weighted on groupwise heteroscedasticity)
 with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity
 with panel–corrected standard errors
 with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity and cross–sectional correlation
DPD (difference)
 Arellano–Bond one–step procedure
DPD (difference)
 Arellano–Bond two–step procedure
TaxBurden(D)
–0.5470
(–3.59)
(–2.88)
(–5.43)
–0.5086
(–3.83)
(–3.52)
(–3.54)
–0.6834
(–3.65)
–0.5341
(–1.74)
TaxBurden(L)
–0.6905
(–3.20)
(–3.35)
(–6.57)
–0.6494
(–3.89)
(–4.43)
(–8.00)
–0.8547
(–3.67)
–0.7684
(–2.16)
Note: Coeffi cient estimates are boldface; t–statistics are reported in parentheses. Each estimation procedure esti-
mates the same variable specifi cation as column 2 of Table 3. The fi rst set of OLS results repeats those results for 
comparison’s sake. The respective estimation procedures are described in greater detail in the fourth section.
24 I chose this estimation procedure given that testing of the residuals produced evidence of groupwise het-
eroscedasticity and cross–sectional correlation.
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TABLE 5
ROBUSTNESS CHECK USING ALTERNATIVE CUTS OF THE DATA
Variable Name
Tax burden
Education
Working population
Nonwhite
Female
Population
Agriculture
Mining
Union
Diversity
LNY_1
Number of observations
D/L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
D
L
D
L
D
D
L
(1)
5–Year Data
1970–1974,
1975–1979,
…,
1995–1999
–0.5086
(–3.54)
–0.6494
(–8.00)
1.6935
(4.81)
1.0819
(5.69)
1.7580
(4.90)
1.2660
(13.50)
1.3004
(4.84)
–3.2024
(–4.38)
4.1887
(6.63)
0.5061
(5.66)
0.3592
(5.79)
–0.4663
(–2.48)
0.1045
(3.07)
–0.2312
(–1.86)
–39.042
(–12.67)
288
(2)
5–Year Data
1970–1975,
1975–1980,
…,
1995–2000
–0.5616
(–3.91)
–0.4179
(–3.00)
1.4690
(5.33)
1.3104
(5.94)
0.8836
(4.06)
1.3152
(13.92)
0.9542
(4.08)
–1.1457
(–1.51)
5.5797
(3.75)
0.5657
(5.44)
0.4739
(6.47)
0.0357
(0.23)
0.0776
(1.73)
–0.2516
(–1.81)
–43.288
(–12.85)
288
(3)
5–Year Data
1971–1975,
1976–1980,
…,
1996–2000
–0.4545
(–3.47)
–0.3096
(–2.01)
1.7034
(6.12)
1.0290
(5.03)
0.5753
(1.97)
1.0980
(10.50)
0.5168
(3.06)
–0.8878
(–2.12)
4.6138
(2.88)
0.3047
(2.24)
0.5536
(6.00)
0.0780
(0.57)
0.0843
(4.96)
0.0764
(0.94)
–34.17
(–11.61)
288
Note: Each of the three sets of regression results employs FGLS (weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) 
with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity and cross–sectional correlation. t–statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the respective coeffi cient estimates. The fi rst column reproduces previous results for comparison’s sake 
(cf. third row from bottom in Table 4). The next two columns show the effects of using different cuts of the 
data.
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respective t–values ranging from –4.38 
to –1.51. The coeffi cients for Mining(D) 
and Diversity(L) also show substantial 
variation, even switching signs. Indeed, 
the coefficient for TaxBurden(L) in col-
umn 3 is less than one–half the size of the 
equivalent estimate in column 1, with 
a correspondingly large change in the 
respective t–statistic.
Nevertheless, these estimates provide 
overall confi rmation of the previous tax 
burden results. Across the alternative time 
divisions of the data, the coeffi cients of 
the two tax variables are uniformly, nega-
tively signed and statistically signifi cant, 
always having a t–statistic larger than two 
in absolute value.
Robustness across Time Periods, 
Regions, and States 
A possible concern with previous esti-
mates is that the results may be driven by 
a few time periods, regions, or states with 
particularly strong relationships between 
tax burden and income growth, and that 
these may not be broadly representative 
for the majority of observations. Previous 
specifi cations assumed that the estimated 
tax effects were the same for all observa-
tions. In this section, I use interaction 
terms to estimate individual time period, 
region, and state effects. 
I fi rst check for robustness across time 
periods. There are a total of six fi ve–year 
periods: 1970–1974, 1975–1979, 1980–1984, 
1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999. The 
variable specification for this analysis 
continues to use the “Best SIC Specifi ca-
tion” from Table 3, but supplements it 
with time–interaction effects to capture 
changes in the tax burden/income growth 
relationship over time. Following the pre-
vious results on estimation procedures, 
all coeffi cients are estimated using FGLS 
(with weighting for groupwise heterosce-
dasticity), with a White robust estimator 
for heteroscedasticity and cross–sectional 
correlation used to calculate standard 
errors. I fi rst estimate time–specifi c coeffi -
cients for the variable TaxBurden(D). I then 
repeat the robustness check by estimating 
time–specifi cation coeffi cients for the vari-
able TaxBurden(L). 
Table 6 summarizes the results. Notably, 
each of the 12 time–specifi c coeffi cients 
is negative. Ten of the 12 are individu-
ally signifi cant. While the pattern is not 
perfect, smaller estimated coeffi cients for 
TaxBurden(D) are generally accompanied 
by larger coeffi cients for TaxBurden(L), and 
vice versa.25 A similar pattern is observed 
when I estimate region– and state–specifi c 
interaction terms. An interpretation con-
sistent with these results is that changes 
in tax burden take longer to register their 
TABLE 6
ROBUSTNESS CHECK ACROSS TIME PERIODS
Time Period
1970–1974
1975–1979
1980–1984
1985–1989
1990–1994
1995–1999
Time–Specifi c Coeffi cients
TaxBurden(D) TaxBurden(L)
Coeffi cient
–1.1551
–0.7518
–0.0615
–0.1642
–0.6450
–1.1014
t–statistic
–9.83
–4.58
–0.24
–0.71
–2.97
–5.17
Coeffi cient
–0.3062
–0.6710
–0.6455
–0.9044
–1.0086
–0.5286
t–statistic
–5.18
–7.32
–7.18
–6.61
–8.20
–4.98
Note: Regression results are derived from a regression equation having the variable specifi cation of column 2 of 
Table 3, supplemented with the respective time–interaction dummy variables (cf. the text for further details). The 
estimation procedure is FGLS (weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with robust VCE for heteroscedastic-
ity and cross–sectional correlation.
25 The smaller estimated coeffi cients for TaxBurden(D) during the 1980s is consistent with the fi ndings of Carroll 
and Wasylenko (1994), though their study focused on state employment.
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effects for some time periods, regions, 
and states. That being said, the main 
fi nding from Table 6 is that the estimated 
relationships between income growth, 
and both the differenced and level forms 
of tax burden, are negative for every time 
period.
Table 7 reports the results of a similar 
analysis checking for robustness across the 
eight BEA regions and 48 states. The top 
part of the table reports the results of the 
regional analysis: 15 of the 16 estimated 
tax effects are negative; ten are signifi cant 
at the ten percent level. The bottom part of 
the table reports a summary analysis for 
the states: Of the 48, state–specifi c coef-
fi cients for TaxBurden(D), 72.9 percent are 
negative. Of these, 15 are statistically sig-
nifi cant at the ten percent level, and 13 of 
these are negative (86.7 percent). The cor-
responding numbers for the TaxBurden(L) 
coefficients are 64.5 and 69.2 percent, 
respectively. Only two states (Montana 
and Virginia) have positive coeffi cients 
for both TaxBurden(D) and TaxBurden(L), 
and none of the associated coeffi cients 
are signifi cant at the ten percent level. 
In contrast, 20 states have negative 
coeffi cients for both tax variables. In 11 
of these cases, at least one of the tax coef-
fi cients is signifi cant at the ten percent 
level.
The results of Table 7 are not as robust 
as those of Table 6. In general, I fi nd that 
as the data are cut into fi ner slices, the 
results become less consistent. By the 
time I get to the state level, there are only 
six observations per estimated coeffi cient 
(compared to 48 observations for the 
time–period analyses).26 Nevertheless, it 
is clear that the fi nding of negative and 
statistically signifi cant tax effects applies 
widely across time periods, regions, and 
states; and is not driven by a few observa-
tions exerting a disproportionately strong 
infl uence.
Region–Specifi c Coeffi cients:
 Great Lakes
 Mid–Atlantic
 New England
 Plains
 Rocky Mountain
 South
 Southwest
 West
State–Specifi c Coeffi cients:
 Total number of coeffi cients/Number negative
 (Percent negative)
 Total number of signifi cant coeffi cients/Number negative
 (Percent negative)
TABLE 7
ROBUSTNESS CHECK ACROSS BEA REGIONS AND STATES
TaxBurden(D) TaxBurden(L)
Coeffi cient
–0.2226
–0.6228
–0.5956
–0.7237
–0.3329
–0.5232
–1.2132
–0.7435
t–statistic
–0.36
–1.97
–1.58
–2.15
–2.22
–2.29
–1.68
–2.49
Coeffi cient
–0.5268
–0.4599
–0.7789
–0.2635
–1.1408
–0.4521
 0.4150
–0.0570
t–statistic
–1.79
–1.90
–2.13
–2.16
–3.39
–1.28
 0.87
–0.10
48/35
(72.9)
15/13
(86.7)
48/31
(64.5)
13/9
(69.2)
Note: Regression results are derived from a regression equation having the variable specifi cation of column 2 
of Table 3, supplemented with the respective interaction dummy variables (cf. the text for further details). The 
estimation procedure is FGLS (weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity 
and cross–sectional correlation. For the last row, statistical signifi cance is defi ned at the 10 percent level.
26 An alternative approach that estimates individual state effects without a great sacrifi ce in degrees of freedom 
is to include squared terms for both tax variables. This allows taxes to exert either positive or negative effects 
on income growth, depending on the value of the respective tax variable. When I did this, I found that the 
individual, state–specifi c tax effects were negative for every state for both tax variables, except for one state 
with a large outlier value for the TaxBurden[D] variable. I thank a referee for suggesting this approach.
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Robustness across Alternative 
Specifi cations of Government Finances 
As Helms (1985) points out, the govern-
ment budget constraint should always be 
kept in mind when interpreting the coef-
fi cients of fi scal variables: 
(Tax Revenues + Non–Tax Revenues) 
 – (Welfare Expenditures 
 + “Productive Expenditures”) 
 + Defi cit = 0 ,
where I defi ne “Productive Expenditures” as 
all state and local Direct General Expen-
ditures other than Public Welfare. Thus, 
an increase in taxes must be accompanied 
by some combination of (1) a decrease in 
Non–Tax Revenues (e.g., fees and federal 
aid), (2) an increase in Welfare Expendi-
tures or Productive Expenditures, and (3) 
a decrease in the Defi cit. Previous speci-
fi cations did not attempt to distinguish 
these alternatives. 
Table 8 reports the results of including 
variables for both differences and levels 
of Non–Tax Revenues and Welfare, appro-
priately divided by state Personal Income. 
In column 2, the coeffi cients on the tax 
variables should now be interpreted as 
estimating the effect of an increase in taxes 
matched by a corresponding increase 
in general expenditures (as a practical 
matter, we can ignore deficits as they 
are usually negligibly small compared 
to overall revenues and expenditures.) 
The tax coeffi cients remain negative and 
statistically signifi cant. 
Column 3 adds welfare variables to 
the specifi cation. The tax coeffi cients in 
this specifi cation should be interpreted 
as estimating the effect of an increase 
in taxes matched by a correspond-
ing increase in Productive Expendi-
tures. Again, the estimated coeffi cients 
remain negative and statistically sig-
nifi cant. Column 4 removes the Non–Tax 
Revenue variables from the specifi cation, 
with no change in the overall fi nding of 
negative and statistically signifi cant tax 
effects.
TABLE 8
ROBUSTNESS ACROSS ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES
TaxBurden(D)
TaxBurden(L)
NonTaxRevenues(D)
NonTaxRevenues(L)
Welfare(D)
Welfare(L)
(1)
Only Taxes
–0.5086
(–3.54)
–0.6494
(–8.00)
—
—
—
—
(2)
Taxes +
Non–Tax Revenues
–0.4020
(–2.82)
–0.4866
(–7.63)
–0.3763
(–2.98)
–0.3784
(–3.39)
—
—
(3)
Taxes +
Non–Tax Revenues + 
Welfare Expenditures
–0.4654
(–2.58)
–0.5913
(–7.38)
–0.4306
(–3.36)
–0.4375
(–2.94)
0.6157
(3.49)
0.5749
(1.84)
(4)
Taxes +
Welfare Expenditures
–0.5622
(–3.45)
–0.7277
(–8.13)
—
—
0.5131
(3.14)
0.3482
(1.29)
Note: Regression results are derived from a regression equation having the variable specifi cation of column 2 
of Table 3, supplemented with the respective interaction dummy variables (cf. the text for further details). The 
estimation procedure is FGLS (weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity 
and cross–sectional correlation. The fi rst column reproduces previous results for comparison’s sake (cf. the next to 
last row of Table 4). “Non–Tax Revenues” are defi ned as General Revenues minus Total Taxes divided by income. 
“Welfare” is defi ned as Direct General Expenditures on Public Welfare divided by income.
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It is interesting to note that the negative 
tax effects are close in size to the corre-
sponding negative effects associated with 
Non–Tax Revenues.27 This is consistent 
with an interpretation that both variables 
are measuring negative effects associated 
with a larger public sector, and that the 
added, distortionary effects of taxes are 
negligible. 
On the other hand, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for 
the welfare variables are puzzling. A 
possible explanation is that transfer pay-
ments are almost exclusively received 
by state residents, and hence, contribute 
directly to state income.28 In contrast, 
other government expenditures can be 
diverted outside the state’s economy (e.g., 
as payments to out–of–state suppliers of 
government services or supplies), so that 
the corresponding stimulative spending 
effects may not contribute to income 
growth within the state. 
WHY HAVE PREVIOUS STUDIES 
FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE 
ROBUST TAX EFFECTS?
In this section I show that annual data 
produces substantially different estimates 
of tax effects compared to fi ve–year inter-
val data. This may provide an explanation 
for why previous studies have found it 
diffi cult to estimate robust tax effects. 
Column 1 of Table 9 uses OLS to esti-
mate an annual analogue to the variable 
specifi cation of column 2 in Table 3. The 
data cover 1970–1999 and include the log 
of capital, employment, and population, 
along with state and annual time fi xed 
effects and a number of other control 
variables. The dependent variable is the 
log of real PCPI. I begin by following the 
conventional practice of only including 
contemporaneous values of the explana-
tory variables.
In contrast to the prior results, I now 
estimate a positive relationship between 
tax burden and state incomes. A one–per-
centage point increase in tax burden is 
estimated to increase real state PCPI by 
0.16 percent. Further, the coeffi cient is sig-
nifi cant well below the fi ve percent level, 
with a t–value of just over three. 
To check the sensitivity of this result, 
I drop various sets of variables from the 
specifi cation of column 1. Column 2 drops 
the capital, employment, population, and 
lagged income variables. Column 3 drops 
these, plus the control variables. Col-
umn 4 drops these, plus all fi xed effects. 
While the tax coeffi cient remains positive 
throughout, its size and statistical signifi -
cance is unstable across specifi cations.
A somewhat different picture emerges 
when the specifi cation is broadened to 
allow lagged effects. Column 5 reports 
the results of adding lagged values of the 
tax burden variable to the specifi cation 
of column 1. While the contemporane-
ous relationship between tax burden and 
income growth remains positive, lagged 
values of tax burden are estimated to be 
negatively associated with state income. 
This suggests that previous studies 
may have failed to identify a negative 
relationship between taxes and income 
growth because they relied on specifi ca-
tions that used annual data and did not 
allow for lagged tax effects. My analysis 
suggests that tax policies take time to 
work its full effects on the economy. When 
the specifi cation is suffi ciently general to 
pick up these effects, a negative relation-
ship between taxes and income growth 
emerges. 
The use of annual data may also 
have contributed to previous findings 
27 We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coeffi cients associated with the difference and level forms of the 
two kinds of revenues are the same. The associated p–values for the specifi cations of columns 2 and 3 are 0.51 
and 0.47.
28 State Personal Income as measured by the BEA includes transfer payments.
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX BURDEN AND INCOME GROWTH 
USING ANNUAL DATA
TaxBurden
TaxBurden(–1)
TaxBurden(–2)
TaxBurden(–3)
TaxBurden(–4)
LNK
LNL
LNN
LNY_1
Education
Working population
Nonwhite
Female
Agriculture
Mining
Union
Diversity
Other variables
Number of observations
R2
(1)
0.0016
(3.06)
—
—
—
—
0.0754
(8.84)
0.1073
(8.19)
0.0064
(5.91)
0.7466
(65.25)
0.0034
(10.38)
0.0056
(11.85)
–0.0004
(–2.84)
0.0112
(8.33)
0.0028
(12.11)
–0.0005
(–1.16)
0.0008
(5.31)
0.0032
(7.06)
state fi xed 
effects, year 
fi xed effects
1440
0.994
(2)
0.0017
(1.11)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.0174
(20.17)
0.0288
(25.28)
–0.0008
(–2.38)
–0.0014
(–0.37)
0.0057
(11.53)
0.0029
(4.80)
0.0049
(15.24)
0.0039
(3.17)
state fi xed 
effects, year 
fi xed effects
1440
0.944
(3)
0.0174
(8.77)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
state fi xed 
effects, year 
fi xed effects
1440
0.843
(4)
0.0040
(1.16)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1440
0.448
(5)
0.0064
(6.27)
–0.0025
(–1.96)
–0.0020
(–1.62)
–0.0001
(–0.11)
–0.0025
(–2.63)
0.0936
(9.97)
0.1330
(9.79)
0.0034
(3.29)
0.7180
(55.54)
0.0038
(10.62)
0.0055
(11.19)
–0.0001
(–1.09)
0.0127
(8.95)
0.0015
(5.11)
–0.0011
(–2.74)
0.0013
(8.45)
0.0017
(3.10)
state fi xed 
effects, year 
fi xed effects
1248
0.993
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars). All equations are 
estimated using OLS. t–statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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of coefficient instability. Though they 
are positively correlated, tax burden 
has been demonstrated to substantially 
mismeasure state tax policy (Reed and 
Rogers, 2006, 2007). Annual data are more 
vulnerable to measurement error bias than 
fi ve–year interval data. Consequently, it 
would not be surprising if estimates of tax 
effects based on annual data were prone 
to instability depending on the particular 
distribution of measurement errors in the 
sample. This may be an additional reason 
why previous studies have had diffi culty 
identifying robust tax effects. 
CONCLUSION
Using fi ve–year data from 1970–1999 
and the 48 continental states, I fi nd that 
both (1) contemporaneous changes and (2) 
lagged levels of taxes are negatively and 
signifi cantly related to income growth. 
The estimated effects vary depending 
on variable specifi cation; estimation pro-
cedure; time period, region, and state; 
and the manner in which the data are 
organized into fi ve–year intervals. Nev-
ertheless, the fi nding of negative and sta-
tistically signifi cant tax effects is generally 
robust across all of these dimensions, with 
one exception: State–specifi c estimates of 
tax effects widely vary. This latter result 
may be explained by the narrow parsing 
of the data. At this level of analysis there 
are only six observations per state–specifi c 
tax coeffi cient. 
These results are surprising given that 
previous studies have had diffi culty iden-
tifying a robust relationship between state 
taxes and incomes. My analysis suggests 
that this may be because previous studies 
of state income growth have tended to use 
annual data, have differed in their vari-
able specifi cations, and have not allowed 
for lagged tax effects. When I use annual 
data and restrict the analysis to contem-
poraneous tax effects, I estimate positive 
tax effects, but the sizes and signifi cances 
of the tax coeffi cient greatly vary depend-
ing on variable specification. When I 
include lagged values of the tax variable, 
a negative relationship between taxes and 
growth emerges. This lack of robustness is 
not apparent in the fi ve–year interval data. 
This may be because the variables inter-
act over time in complex ways that are 
diffi cult to model. It may also be that the 
data—for defi nitional and measurement 
reasons—are not well–suited to relating 
to each other at the annual level. 
It needs to be emphasized that my claim 
for robustness should be understood as 
applying only within the context of U.S. 
state income growth. It should not be 
interpreted as being more widely appli-
cable to other contexts, such as employ-
ment growth, manufacturing activity, 
plant locations, etc., or to the relationship 
between taxes and income growth outside 
the U.S.
Much work remains to be done before 
reliable estimates of tax effects can be 
obtained.29 However, this study establishes 
that there is a durable empirical relation-
ship between taxes and U.S. state income 
growth that warrants further investiga-
tion. Obtaining a better understanding of 
the nature and cause of that relationship 
is a potentially fruitful avenue for future 
research. It is hoped that this study will 
stimulate efforts towards that end.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF DATA
Variable
DLNY1
DLNK2
DLNL3
DLNN4
Tax burden5
Education6
Working population6
Nonwhite6
Female6
Population6
Population density6
Urban6
Agriculture6
Manufacturing6
Service6
Mining6
Union6
Diversity6
LNY_17
NonTaxRevenues8
Welfare9
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
D
L
Mean
  8.23
  7.42
  4.66
  4.63
  0.13
 10.87
  1.77
 16.41
  0.97
 55.84
  0.56
 11.75
 –0.02
 51.23
 14.93
  4.93
162.25
  0.75
 67.18
 –0.06
  3.28
 –0.81
 20.93
  1.47
 19.51
 –0.19
  2.15
 –1.47
 18.48
 –0.06
 17.36
  2.53
  0.33
  8.16
  0.19
  2.15
Std. Deviation
  5.20
  7.81
  3.99
  4.48
  0.88
  1.37
  0.55
  4.92
  0.93
  3.18
  0.51
  8.76
  0.15
  0.77
  1.00
  6.68
230.78
  1.13
 14.43
  2.46
  3.98
  1.68
  8.42
  1.25
  5.65
  0.76
  3.53
  2.36
  8.12
  0.77
  2.05
  0.20
  0.93
  2.29
  0.52
  0.83
Minimum
 –9.38
–26.92
 –7.22
 –8.63
 –5.52
  7.92
  0.34
  6.66
 –1.22
 47.54
 –0.98
  0.36
 –0.57
 48.77
 12.72
 –8.44
  3.44
 –1.97
 32.16
–16.72
 –8.92
 –6.09
  3.73
 –3.22
 10.93
 –3.29
  0.02
–10.6
  3.3
 –5.42
 13.84
  1.96
 –2.13
  3.44
 –1.70
  0.75
Maximum
  40.45
  55.43
  14.97
  21.45
   5.91
  19.27
   3.21
  30.21
   2.93
  62.26
   2.42
  37.35
   0.75
  52.76
  17.27
  37.26
1089.83
   3.96
  93.54
  18.85
  29.06
   3.37
  40.49
   6.40
  41.55
   4.27
  24.98
   5.0
  41.7
   4.66
  23.56
   3.06
   6.26
  20.13
   2.88
   5.30
Variable Descriptions:
1DLNY is the percent change in real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars). 
2DLNK is the percent change in net private Capital Stock created through 1–digit SIC industries (measured in mil-
lions of chained 1996 dollars). These data were provided by Steve Yamarik (cf. Garofalo and Yamarik, 2002).
3DLNL is the percent change in total employment (source: BEA).
4DLNN is the percent change in total population (source: Census).
5Tax burden is the ratio of total state and local tax revenues over total state personal income.
6These variables are described in Table 2. “D” denotes the fi ve–year difference in the variable over the period (t 
– 4, t). “L” denotes the value of the variable at the beginning of the fi ve–year period.
7LNY_1 is the value of the log of real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars) at the beginning of the fi ve–year 
period.
8“NonTaxRevenues” is defi ned as General Revenues (state + local) minus Total Taxes (state + local) divided by 
Personal Income at the start of the fi scal year (source: Census). 
9“Welfare” is defi ned as Direct General Expenditure of State and Local Governments on Public Welfare divided 
by Personal Income at the start of the fi scal year (source: Census).
